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TORT REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE
DOUGLAS D. SCHERER*
More than three million American women suffer severe beatings
from their husbands each year.1 Verbal threats and harassment accom-
pany physical harm or occur without physical harm. Evidence of inten-
tionally inflicted harm is readily available in serious cases through po-
lice reports, medical records, witnesses, and admissions by perpetrators
who genuinely believe that they are justified in their abusive conduct.
If the victim brings a civil action for damages based upon conduct that
resulted in a criminal conviction, the perpetrator may be precluded
from contesting the underlying facts in the civil action.2 This resolves
the issues of causation and liability and leaves only damages in dispute
in the civil action.
In light of this, why have trial lawyers not been more active in
bringing civil actions for money damages based upon domestic vio-
lence? Why have they not furthered the public interest by combatting
this morally repugnant conduct? The assumption of the author is that
trial lawyers simply are unaware of the potential for significant mone-
tary damages in these actions. They mistakenly assume that such ac-
tions are barred by the interspousal immunity doctrine, even though
this doctrine does not bar the great majority of potential actions. They
also do not realize that nearly all jurisdictions permit litigation of mat-
rimonial torts independent of divorce proceedings. Actions for battery
and assault are available in all American jurisdictions. The suitability
of these actions in domestic abuse cases that involve physical injury or
* Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. B.A. 1962,
Case Western Reserve University; J.D. 1969, Suffolk University Law School; LL.M. 1978,
Harvard Law School. The author is grateful for the assistance generously provided by
Professor Eileen Kaufman of the Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Profes-
sor Beverly Birns of the State University of New York at Stony Brook, and attorneys
Karen Miller and Susan Menu.
1. HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 3 (Vincent B. Van Hasselt et al. eds., 1988).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85(2)(a) (1982) ("A judgment in
favor of the prosecuting authority is preclusive in favor of a third person in a later civil
action against the defendant in the criminal prosecution."); see also King v. Prudential
Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 684 F. Supp. 347, 349 (D.N.H. 1988) (applying New Hamp-
shire law); Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209, 214-15 (Fla. 1989); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Hay-
ward, 464 A.2d 156, 160 (Me. 1983); Knoblauch v. Kenyon, 415 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987); Hopps v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 506 A.2d 294, 297 (N.H. 1985).
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threat of physical injury is readily apparent. Nearly all American juris-
dictions recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, an action that is especially appropriate for a continuing pattern
of domestic abuse.
This Article discusses the use of intentional tort actions by victims
of domestic abuse who seek monetary damages. Part I discusses the
phenomenon of domestic abuse, with emphasis on physical and emo-
tional harm and factors that justify punitive and compensatory damage
awards. Part II discusses the torts of battery, assault, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and the appropriateness of these ac-
tions in domestic abuse cases. Part III discusses the interspousal im-
munity doctrine and demonstrates the limited extent to which the doc-
trine bars domestic abuse tort actions. Finally, Part IV discusses
judicial acceptance of tort actions in domestic abuse cases. An Appen-
dix, which lists reported cases, follows this Article.
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF DOMESTIC ABUSE
For purposes of this Article domestic abuse is harm intentionally
inflicted by one adult upon another during the course of or after the
termination of a domestic relationship. The phrase domestic relation-
ship includes marital relationships and nonmarital relationships with
varying degrees of intimacy or prior intimacy.3 Although child abuse
often occurs in tandem with abuse directed at an adult, the Article's
focus is upon adult-to-adult conduct.4 Abuse of elders also is excluded
from consideration.
5
3. An excellent 1981 article provides statistical data concerning women who
sought assistance at La Casa De Las Madres, a shelter for victims of domestic abuse in
San Francisco. One hundred and forty-six women were residents at the shelter between
March and September of 1977. Thirty-six percent were victims of abuse by men to whom
they were not married (the categories were: married-53%, single-20%, sepa-
rated-12%, cohabiting-12%, and divorced-4%). Constance F. Fain, Conjugal Vio-
lence: Legal and Psychosociological Remedies, 32 SYRACUSE L. REV. 497, 565 n.349 (1981)
(citing Marta S. Ashley, Shelters: Short Term Needs, in BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF
PUBLIC POLICY 371, 380-81 (1978)).
4. Approximately one-third of the male spouse batterers in the sample used for a
1975-78 study also beat their children. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 27
(1979). A 1975 study of 100 battered wives demonstrated that 54% of the wife batterers
abused their children. Suzanne K. Steinmetz, The Violent Family, in VIOLENCE IN THE
HOME: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 51, 62 (Mary Lystad ed., 1986). An illustrative
case is Caron v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178 (Me. 1990), in which a man subjected his wife and
stepson to physical and emotional abuse. The court upheld an award for punitive dam-
ages'of $75,000 to the woman and $35,000 to her son. Id. at 1181.
5. Public focus on abusive conduct among family members began with child
abuse, expanded to spousal abuse, and now extends to physical and emotional abuse of
elderly persons by younger family members. Dr. Marion Goldstein, a specialist in geriat-
[Vol. 43
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Domestic abuse typically occurs in a home setting, even if the per-
petrator no longer resides in the home. However, tortious conduct may
occur in other settings such as the victim's place of employment. Most
domestic abuse involves male perpetrators and female victims.
"[P]sychiatric disorders that predispose[] individuals to violence or
submission to violence"6 is a purported cause of domestic abuse. One
commentator, Mary Russell, explained the phenomenon in a "family
systems theory,"'7 which treats spousal abuse as "a mutual problem
rather than the fault of one partner."s Experts sometimes utilize a "so-
cial learning theory,"9 which "conceptualizes violence as a learned be-
havior rather than psychopathology or character deficit."' 0 Feminist
theory also regards hostility and aggression by males against females as
a "socially learned phenomenon.""'
Russell discussed sociological theories that focus on "cultural
ric psychiatry, concluded that an abuser of an elderly person most often is a caregiver
who "is a middle-aged woman. . . whose caregiving and self-sacrificing have brought her
to exhaustion." Marion Z. Goldstein, Elder Neglect, Abuse, and Exploitation, in FAMILY
VIOLENCE: EMERGING ISSUES OF A NATIONAL CRISIS 99, 103 (Leah J. Dickstein & Carol C.
Nadelson eds., 1989). Another author, in contrast, referred to "[s]everal studies [which]
found that the abuser is more likely to be a male caretaker." ROBERT T. SIGLER, DoMEs-
TIC VIOLENCE IN CONTEXT. AN ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNITY ATTITUDES 58 (1989).
6. Mary Russell, Wife Assault Theory, Research and Treatment: A Literature
Review, 3 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 193, 194 (1988).
7. Id. at 195.
8. Id. An example of a perverse application of this mutual problem approach is
Desmond v. Desmond, 509 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Farn. Ct. 1986). A woman fled to Virginia with
her children to escape abuse from her former husband, The abuse consisted of "repeated
acts of physical terror and forced sex over a number of years, commingled with emo-
tional abuse (much of which was seen or heard by the children)," id. at 983, and "re-
peated acts of assault and battery upon her face, back, and buttocks with her husband's
fists and feet," id. at 983-84. The abuser petitioned for custody on the theory that his
former wife acted improperly when she removed the children from New York. The judge
permitted the woman to retain custody and continue to live in Virginia, but directed
"that both parents undergo psychological counseling separately" and that they provide
counseling "by a licensed mental health professional" for the children. Id. at 984.
9. Russell, supra note 6, at 195.
10. Id. Russell discussed "modeling," noting that a "high incidence of batterers
.. .witnessed family violence as children." Id. Focusing on victims she wrote: "Learned
helplessness... has been used to explain assaulted women's seeming passivity in the
face of repeated violence." Id. Research findings "support the now widely held belief
that wife abuse is learned behavior transmitted from generation to generation. Appar-
ently some women learn to accept violent behavior and some men learn to be abusive
from many factors including early childhood experiences with abuse." Bonnie Y. Lewis,
Psychosocial Factors Related to Wife Abuse, 2 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 1, 9 (1987).
11. James V.P. Check, Hostility Toward Women: Some Theoretical Considera-
tions, in VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 29, 34 (Gordon W. Russell ed., 1988).
Check separately analyzed the interconnected phenomena of hostility toward women and
the use of aggression to express hostility. Id.
1992]
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norms that permit such behavior and social organization that fosters
its occurrence. ' 12 Under this approach the family "is viewed as rein-
forcing social inequalities based on gender and economics that increase
the likelihood of abuse."13 Russell described a 1980 national survey
which "revealed that 24% of males and 22% of females viewed minor
violence against their spouses as normal.'
' 4
Similarly, Walker evaluated the effect of religious and social cus-
toms combined with inadequate protection provided to women by the
criminal justice system.1 5 She concluded that religious and social cus-
toms lead a man to believe that "his rights invariably supersede" those
of his wife."s According to Walker, "America's social, legal, and reli-
gious institutions perpetuate the myth that a woman is to blame for
being battered."'7
Clinical studies have evaluated the causes of spousal abuse and the
frequency of its occurrence. 8 Domestic abuse is not confined to lower
economic and social levels. Professional and white collar workers per-
petrate acts of domestic abuse along with laborers, blue collar workers,
12. Russell, supra note 6, at 198.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KLL AND How
SociETY RESPONDS 236-38 (1989).
16. Id. at 236.
17. Id. at 235. Walker wrote:
In light of all this, it is no mystery that batterers believe they have the
right to "discipline" a woman. Furthermore, they believe that others, including
legal authorities, have no right to interfere. And many battered women have
been socialized to believe not only that their men have the right to beat them
but that, if they are beaten, they must somehow deserve to be beaten. Even
though many women understand that battering is the man's problem, they feel
guilty nevertheless; despite what they know, they feel that somehow, some
way, they could have done something "better" to help him stop himself.
Id. at 237.
18. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of causative factors of domestic
abuse, see Fain, supra note 3, at 510-17; see also Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Violence
Among Intimates-An Epidemiological Review, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE, 293,
294 (Vincent B. Van Hassett et al. eds., 1988). The authors wrote:
Feminists argue that male violence against women and children is differ-
ent than other forms of domestic violence because it converges with broader
patterns of discrimination. This combination of assault and discrimination
against women leads to entrapment and is manifested in a distinct clinical pro-
file-"the battering syndrome"--which evokes a range of psychosocial
problems alongside injury. However, the majority of nonfeminist clinicians and
researchers approach various forms of domestic violence-including wife-hus-
band assault and elder abuse-as symptomatic of distinct family dynamics,
psychopathology, and stress.
[Vol. 43
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and unemployed persons. Walker's studies confirmed this fact.
Most battered women are from middle-class and higher-income homes
.... Although some battered women are jobless, many more are
highly competent workers and successful career women. They include
doctors, lawyers, corporation executives, nurses, secretaries, full-time
homemakers, and others. Battered women are found in all age groups,
races, ethnic and religious groups, educational levels, and socioeco-
nomic groups.1"
Walker explained the myth that "[m]iddle-class women do not get
battered as frequently or as violently as do poorer women"2 0 as follows:
Most previously recorded statistics of battering have come from
lower-class families. However, lower-class women are more likely to
come in contact with community agencies and so their problems are
more visible. Middle- and upper-class women do not want to make
their batterings public. They fear social embarrassment and harming
their husbands' careers. Many also believe the respect in which their
husbands are held in the community will cast doubt upon the credibil-
ity of their battering stories.21
A recent comparative study of women who are "at-risk" for wife
assault noted that women of higher socioeconomic status reported be-
ing verbally assaulted and subjected to "minor physical violence" as
often as women of lower socioeconomic status.2 2 However, "lower socio-
19. WALKER, supra note 4, at 18-19.
20. Id. at 21.
21. Id. at 21-22. Fain discussed this myth as follows:
Contrary to the myth that battering occurs more frequently among lower
income groups, spouse abuse may occur in any home. Extensive research has
revealed that the practice of wife abuse permeates all racial, cultural, educa-
tional, and economic classes, and occurs in both urban and rural communities.
One reason for the myth that marital abuse is a problem that exists primarily
among low income groups is the failure of medical doctors, psychologists, min-
isters, marriage counselors, and family members to report incidents of abuse to
the police. Thus, cases involving middle income persons may not come to the
attention of the legal community and social agencies. Although statistics are
available from police records, they are inadequate because these offenses often
are unrecorded or are classified as assaults or homicides with no indication
that they are marital abuse cases. Furthermore, police records are inadequate
indicators of the magnitude of the problem. They contain little information
about the socioeconomic level of offenders and victims. Poor persons usually
resort to the police for protection, whereas middle and upper income persons
procure the services of medical doctors, ministers, marriage counselors, and
other professionals.
Fain, supra note 3, at 502-03 (footnote omitted).
22. Gerald T. Hotaling & David B. Sugarman, A Risk Marker Analysis of As-
saulted Wives, 5 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 1, 10 (1990).
1992]
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economic women were more likely to be severely assaulted." 23 Reports
are unclear about whether higher socioeconomic status women experi-
ence fewer serious assaults than lower socioeconomic women or
whether they simply report it less. Nonetheless, research clearly shows
that verbal abuse, minor physical abuse, and severe physical assault
occur at all socioeconomic levels.
Low self-esteem is a common characteristic of battered women.
Commentators have suggested that this characteristic is caused by do-
mestic abuse and is not a pre-existing characteristic that leads to a
relationship with an abusive partner.24 Other research indicates that
"low self-esteem and negative self-images" are characteristics that are
shared by abusers and their victims, regardless of how the victims per-
ceived themselves prior to entering into the abusive relationships.
25
Myths and stereotypes permeate uninformed discussion of domes-
tic abuse. Walker debunked the "myth of the masochistic woman" who
"experiences some pleasure, often akin to sexual pleasure, through be-
ing beaten by the man she loves."'28 Walker's studies refute the myths
that "[b]atterers are violent in all their relationships"2 7 and that
"[b]atterers are unsuccessful and lack resources to cope with the
world."28 Walker also identified as a myth the commonly held belief
that batterers cannot change. 29 At the same time she rejected the like-
lihood that a "[1]ong-standing battering relationship can change for the
23. Id.
24. Id. at 9.
25. LEwis OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FAcTS REPLACING MYTHs 66 (1986).
26. WALKER, supra note 4, at 20. Russell cited a 1985 survey which found that
"25% of college males and 14% of college females agree that assaulted wives enjoyed
being hit." Russell, supra note 6, at 199. Abandonment of abusive conduct by a batterer
may require rejection of "an entrenched system of shared socio-cultural sexist attitudes
and role expectations." Jerry L. Jennings, Preventing Relapse Versus "Stopping" Do-
mestic Violence: Do We Expect Too Much Too Soon from Battering Men?, 5 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 43, 48 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
27. WALKER, supra note 4, at 24. Walker wrote: "Based on the women in my study,
I estimate that only about 20 percent of battered women live with men who are violent
not only to them but also to anyone else who gets in their way.... Most men who
batter their wives are generally not violent in other aspects of their lives." Id.
28. Id. Walker referred to findings from a study in England that "physicians, ser-
vice professionals, and police had the highest incidence of wife beating." Id. She also
noted that "batterers in this sample would be indistinguishable from any other group of
men in terms of capability." Id. at 25.
29. "If the psychosocial-learning theory of violent behavior is accurate, then batter-
ers can be taught to relearn their aggressive responses. Assertion rather than aggression,
negotiation rather than coercion, is the goal." Id. at 28. Change by batterers is not easy
and extends beyond abandonment of abusive conduct to rejection of "an entrenched sys-
tem of shared socio-cultural sexist attitudes and role expectations." Jennings, supra note
26, at 48 (emphasis omitted).
[Vol. 43
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better. 3 0
Walker's studies revealed that family violence follows "a definite
battering cycle" consisting of "the tension building phase; the explo-
sive or acute battering incident; and the calm, loving respite. '31
Women commonly are trapped by economic considerations, 32 responsi-
bilities to children, an emotional need to maintain a relationship that
hopefully will improve, a belief that escape is impossible, and a recog-
nition that available remedies are controlled by others.3 3 They often
hold a realistic belief that an abuser will threaten or beat them if they
attempt to escape.34 Escape may be impossible simply because there is
no place else to go.35
Peterson-Lewis and her associates identified the factors that lead a
woman to terminate an abusive relationship.36 They concluded that a
female victim of spousal abuse tends to stay in an abusive relationship
if she perceives that factors outside her personal relationship with the
30. WALKER, supra note 4, at 28. Walker's research led her to the following
conclusion:
Relationships that have been maintained by the man having power over the
woman are stubbornly resistant to an equal power-sharing arrangement. Thus,
even with the best help available, these relationships do not become battering
free. At best, the violent assaults are reduced in frequency and severity. Unas-
sisted, they simply escalate to homicidal and suicidal proportions. The best
hope for such couples is to terminate the relationship. There is a better chance
that with another partner they can reorder the power structure and as equals
can live in a nonviolent relationship.
Id. at 29.
31. Id. at 55.
32. Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz noted, "Women are bound by many economic
and social constraints, and they often have no alternative to putting up with beatings by
their husbands." MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 44 (1981).
33. Okun discussed why victims of abuse return to their abusers after temporary
escape. OKUN, supra note 25, at 55-56.
34. Lenore E. Walker et al., Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1982). Fear also prevents victims from seeking help. Okun wrote:
The fear of retribution from the batterer for seeking help or for revealing the
abusive situation is another major force obstructing the woman from seeking
outside intervention. These fears are justified for the most part. Many of the
most severe conjugal assaults and murders are in response to battered women's
attempts to seek help or to leave.
OKUN, supra note 25, at 72 (footnote omitted).
35. Jill Winter, Executive Director of the Huntington Coalition for the Homeless in
New York, provides emergency shelter and transitional living units for homeless women
and their children. Most of these women are domestic violence victims. When asked why
they stayed as long as they did with abusive partners, nearly all said that they had no
place else to go. Interview with Jill Winter, in New York, N.Y., May 13, 1992.
36. Sonja Peterson-Lewis et al., Attribution Processes in Repeatedly Abused
Women, in VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 107 (Gordon W. Russell ed., 1988).
1992]
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abuser have caused the abuse.37 On the other hand, a victim tends to
leave if she perceives that factors within the relationship, such as the
"negative attitude [of the abuser] toward her," have caused the
abuse.38 A victim who "blame[s] the harmdoer," rather than outside
causes, "is likely to believe that she might be harmed again in the fu-
ture" and is likely to feel anger and a desire to retaliate against the
harmdoer.30
Research revealed common patterns in battering relationships.
These include exposure of male perpetrators to abuse when they were
children,'40 forcible rape of abuse victims by male perpetrators, 4 1 and
social isolation of the couple. 42 Negative characteristics of male batter-
ers include a "tendency to minimize and deny their violent behavior.' 4
They "often see the woman as the cause of their violence.' ' 44 They "are
usually very dependent on their partners as the sole source of love,
support, intimacy, and problem solving.' 4 Furthermore, they demon-
strate "jealousy [and] extreme suspiciousness,"'4 have "low self-es-
teem,"'47 and "tend to be angry and depressed.' 4 Pregnancy increases
the frequency of physical violence, with the focus of attack shifting
from the head and face to the abdomen. 4 Abusers appear to be more
violent in nonmarital relationships than in marital relationships.5 0 For
those who have been married, a significant portion of violence occurs
during separation or after divorce. 1 Sonkin, Martin, and Walker drew
37. Id.
38. Id. at 108.
39. Id. at 113.
40. DANIEL J. SONKIN ET AL., THE MALE BATTERER. A TREATMENT APPROACH 449
(1985).
41. Id. at 17.
42. Id. at 43.
43. Id. at 42.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 43.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 44.
48. Id. at 45. The personal characteristics of male batterers, including their emo-
tional dependence on victims, jealousy, unpredictability, and placement of blame for
abuse on victims, are discussed further in OKUN, supra note 25, at 66-70. Research by
Hamberger and Hastings revealed a high incidence of personality disorders among male
batterers. L. Kevin Hamberger & James E. Hastings, Personality Correlates of Men
Who Abuse Their Partners: A Cross-Validation Study, 1 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 323 (1986).
For a profile of men subject to criminal prosecutions for domestic abuse, see Albert R.
Roberts, Psychosocial Characteristics of Batterers: A Study of 234 Men Charged with
Domestic Violence Offenses, 2 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 81 (1987).
49. OKUN, supra note 25, at 50.
50. Id. at 43.
51. Okun cited national crime statistics demonstrating that "26% of perpetrators
of spouse assaults ... were either legally separated spouses or divorced ex-spouses." Id.
[Vol. 43
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a parallel between men who rape and men who batter. Rapists "ex-
press power and anger"" in their conduct. Similarly, men who batter
express dominance and anger against women and obtain sexual excite-
ment engendered by seeing a victim suffer.53
During the last fifteen years there has been a dramatic increase in
public focus on domestic abuse. All fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia have enacted remedial legislation. 4 The preference for nonin-
tervention has given way to varying degrees of responsiveness by police
officers55 and judges.5 s At the same time the criminal justice system in
general, and criminal court judges in particular, lack enthusiasm for
domestic violence cases.5 7 As Judge June Galvin described:
The cycle of filing and dismissing charges against a family member
committing an act of domestic violence is too familiar to municipal
court judges, prosecutors and police officers. In retrospect, the victim
of domestic violence generally wanted only one result: to have the per-
petrator leave the residence, which was more or less a legally enforced
"cooling off" period.5 8
at 49.
52. SONKIN, supra note 40, at 18.
53. Id.
54. Patricia L. Micklow, Domestic Abuse-The Pariah of the Legal System, in
HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 407, 411 (Vincent B. Van Hasselt et al. eds., 1988) (cita-
tions omitted). By contrast, "no domestic abuse statutes were in effect in the United
States prior to 1975." Id. at 407.
55. Mandatory arrest requirements have modified the conduct of police officers.
See Sarah M. Buel, Recent Development, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 11
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 215 (1988) (discussing the deterrent effect of arrest compared
with mediation or ordering the batterer to leave the premises for eight hours); see also
Lisa G. Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 61 (1984) (presenting a comprehensive model act on domestic abuse that empha-
sizes victim protection). For a comprehensive Canadian study of the factors that influ-
ence police responses to spousal abuse complaints in Quebec City, see F. Lavoie et al.,
Police Attitudes in Assigning Responsibility for Wife Abuse, 4 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 369
(1989). The authors reported that police react differently to situations in which a hus-
band "resorts to physical violence" than to situations "involving threats." Id. at 385. In
the latter situation police "adopt a neutral position toward the abused wife. In fact, they
maintain this neutral position even if the threats are repeated." Id.
56. Protective orders are readily available and are enforced through misdemeanor
prosecutions or contempt proceedings. Many cases discuss the use of protective orders.
See Harper v. Harper, 537 So. 2d 282 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Hall v. Hall, 408 N.W.2d 626
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Marquette
v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Melvin v. Melvin, 580 A.2d 811 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990); Yankoskie v. Lenker, 526 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Eichenlaub v.
Eichenlaub, 490 A.2d 918 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
57. WALKER, supra note 15, at 241 ("It is a fact that batterers often suffer no legal
consequences whatsoever for their behavior.").
58. June R. Galvin, Ohio's New Civil Remedies for Victims of Domestic Violence,
8 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 248, 248 (1981); see Micklow, supra note 54, at 407-08.
19921
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Historically, concern for family privacy has shielded domestic abuse
from external control despite "the social costs of exploitation and vio-
lence in unregulated family relations."'59
There have been improvements during recent years in the criminal
law response to domestic violence,60 and civil protective orders are in
general use.61 This reflects a growing recognition of the need for inter-
vention and effective remedies. 62 The remedies that recently have be-
come available are aimed, however, almost exclusively at violence pre-
vention. They do not redress physical injury and emotional harm, even
for long-suffering victims. The physical injuries suffered by female vic-
tims of domestic abuse can be shocking and permanent in their disa-
bling impact. Emotional injury likewise is extreme and comparable to
injury that supports large emotional pain and suffering awards in tort
litigation. Okun noted that "[v]erbal abuse from the assailant is virtu-
ally always present in battering relationships. This includes threats of
murder against 20% to 40% of victims. Threats of beatings are also
common and appear to be a strictly male behavior. 63 Victims feel
"worthlessness, humiliation, powerlessness, helplessness, self-blame,
and shame.""1
4
Fear, paralyzing terror, and anxiety seem to be the most ubiqui-
59. Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L. REV.
521, 533-39 (1987).
60. Lowell F. Schechter, Introduction: Coping with Family Violence Strategies
and Tactics for the 1980's, 6 VT. L. REv. 325, 328-30 (1981).
61. See supra note 56.
62. Further statistics demonstrate that domestic violence has reached epi-
demic proportions in this society .... A study conducted by the National
Institute of Mental Health revealed that 1.8 million women are severely as-
saulted by their husbands each year, and child abuse is considered to occur in
half of these homes. Additionally, marital abuse has been a contributing factor
in one fourth of all divorces in this country ....
Female victims often suffer severe physical injuries, sometimes resulting in
death. Many non-fatal injuries require emergency medical attention. The fact
that these women were beaten by their spouses, however, often is omitted from
their medical files. The results of one study of hospital emergency room ser-
vices indicated that of the 1,400 women treated in a given period, almost half
had injuries inflicted by their spouses. Hence, the incidence of physical abuse
was approximately ten times more frequent than medical files indicated.
In brief, the conjugal violence problem in this country is a national tragedy that
is approaching epidemic dimensions. Family violence has been described as a
systematic form of torture, a physically or emotionally destructive act, and a
generic disease transmitted from one generation to the next. Statistics and
studies confirm the prevalence of the problem and the extent and nature of the
injuries resulting therefrom.
Fain, supra note 3, at 504 (footnotes omitted).
63. OKUN, supra note 25, at 50 (footnotes omitted).
64. Id. at 71.
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tous emotional experiences among battered women. Victims of woman
abuse are often immobilized by their fear of the batterer and his vio-
lence. This fear can literally petrify the woman so that she is unable
to resist an attack or retaliate. . . . The battered woman's fear in-
cludes anticipation of further conjugal attacks and is magnified by the
unpredictable nature of the assaults .
In terms of psychiatric symptomology, battered women resemble
cases of agitated depression. As a result of prolonged stress, they often
manifest psychosomatic symptoms such as backaches, headaches, and
digestive problems. The battered woman may appear to have aged
prematurely. Often there will be fatigue, restlessness, insomnia, or loss
of appetite. Great amounts of anxiety, guilt, and depression or
dysphoria are typical.
6 5
Follingstad and others evaluated the interrelationship between
physical and emotional abuse through interviews with 234 abused
women. They identified different types of emotional abuse and ana-
lyzed the frequency of occurrence and impact on the victim.6" They
discussed the forms of emotional abuse identified by other researchers,
including "ridicule, verbal harassment, and name-calling"67 ; "isolation
(either social or financial)" 6 ; "jealousy/possessiveness" 69; "verbal
threats of abuse, harm, or torture" 70 ; "threats to divorce or abandon
• . . or to have an affair" 71; and "damage to or destruction of the per-
sonal property of the woman. '72 The Follingstad study revealed that
229 of the 234 abused women (98%) had "experienced at least one in-
65. Id. at 72-73 (footnotes omitted).
66. The authors, citing earlier works by Walker and Ferraro, wrote:
[S]ome battered women described psychological degradation, fear, and humili-
ation as constituting the most painful abuse they experienced. This type of
emotional abuse is seen as having long-term debilitating effects on a woman's
self-esteem, which in turn diminishes her ability to cope with the abuse. The
effects of psychological abuse therefore are seen as contributing to the cycle of
violence in which the battered woman is trapped.
Diane R. Follingstad et al., The Role of Emotional Abuse- in Physically Abusive Rela-
tionships, 5 J. FAm. VIOLENCE 107, 108 (1990) (citations omitted).
Nadelson and Sauzier noted that victims of abuse frequently report "somatic symp-
toms ... such as headaches, asthma, gastrointestinal symptoms, and chronic pain. More
than half of these women had prior psychiatric histories. Depression was the most fre-
quent diagnosis." Carol Nadelson & Maria Sauzier, Intervention Programs for Individ-
ual Victims and Their Families, in VIOLENCE IN THE HoME: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPEC-
TIvE 153, 156 (Mary Lystad ed., 1986).
67. Follingstad, supra note 66, at 108.
68. Id. at 109.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
1992]
11
Scherer: Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse
Published by Scholar Commons, 1992
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cident of emotional abuse""3 and that "[t]he vast majority of the
women (72%) reported experiencing four or more types of emotional
abuse. 7 4 The following table sets forth the number of women who ex-
perienced each of the six types of emotional abuse identified by Fol-
lingstad, and the percentage of women who regarded this type as being
the most damaging to them 5:
Percentage Who
Regarded This
Number Who as the Most
Experienced Damaging Form
This Form of of Emotional
Form of Abuse Emotional Abuse Abuse
Ridicule 211 45.7
Threats of Abuse 174 14.9
Jealousy 170 12.2
Restriction 184 10.4
Threats to Change Marriage 113 5.9
Damage to Property 137 4.5
Follingstad noted that the women "who felt emotional abuse was
worse than physical abuse experienced significantly more ridicule than
women who thought that physical abuse was worse. '76 Ridicule "at-
tacks the women's sense of self-esteem and destroys their ability to feel
good about themselves."
7
7
According to Sonkin, Martin, and Walker, "[p]erception of loss of
control, which is inherent in battering relationships, is one of the criti-
cal factors causing psychological injury to the battered woman. "78 This
combines with feelings of betrayal,7 fear of another beating, 0 lack of
justice,81 and "fear that men will make good their threats to take away
their children"82 and creates a condition of "learned helplessness."' 3 In
many women psychological injury "forms a constellation of symptoms
73. Id. at 113.
74. Id.
75. Id. Sonkin, Martin, and Walker discussed six subcategories of psychological vi-
olence, which consisted of explicit threats of violence, implicit threats of violence, ex-
treme controlling type of behavior, pathological jealousy, mental degradation, and isolat-
ing behavior. SONKIN, supra note 40, at 38-39.
76. Follingstad, supra note 66, at 117.
77. Id.
78. SONKIN, supra note 40, at 152.
79. Id. at 153.
80. Id. at 154.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 155.
83. Id. at 158.
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named Battered Women's Syndrome."' Symptoms "include anxiety,
fear, depression, shock, anger, compassion, guilt, humiliation, confused
thinking, intrusive memories, uncontrolled reexperiencing of traumatic
events, rigidity, lack of trust, suspiciousness, hypervigilence, and in-
creased startle response to cues of possible violence."' 5
The physical and emotional harm suffered by victims of domestic
abuse is shocking. Yet, the existence of a domestic relationship, with or
without marriage, causes lawyers to ignore possible tort actions that
seek money damages. It is as if the lawyers assume that these victims
of tortious conduct are barred in some way from obtaining a remedy
that would be available if the parties had been strangers.
Lawyers who counsel victims of domestic abuse need to employ
sensitive interview techniques to determine the amount of physical and
emotional harm suffered and to assess the likelihood of success in pos-
sible tort actions. A lawyer usually encounters a domestic abuse victim
when she seeks a divorce or civil protective order and has taken steps
to gain control over her life. A tort action may be an important addi-
tional way for her to gain control.86
II. CivL ACTIONS FOR BATTERY, ASSAULT, AND INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The tort actions most useful for domestic abuse cases are those for
battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts discusses the common-law origins of
84. Id. at 160-61. Some courts have recognized battered women's syndrome as a
defense or sentencing factor in criminal cases in which a woman has killed or assaulted a
man who physically abused her. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a
jury's finding that a woman had suffered from battered woman's syndrome because of
continuing abuse by a boyfriend. See Laughlin v. Breaux, 515 So. 2d 480 (La. Ct. App.
1987). Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine accepted the trial court's finding
that a victim of domestic abuse suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome. Caron v.
Caron, 577 A.2d 1178 (Me. 1990).
In addition, women have sought relief through the executive branch. On December
22, 1990, Governor Richard Celeste of Ohio granted clemency to 25 women who had been
denied an opportunity to advance a battered woman syndrome defense and were con-
victed of murder or assault upon physically abusive men. Isabel Wilkerson, Clemency
Granted to 25 Women Convicted for Assault or Murder, N.Y. Ti'ais, Dec. 22, 1990, § 1,
at 1.
85. SONKIN, supra note 40, at 161.
86. Elba Lopez, a highly respected advocate for battered women, reported that
very few of the women that she assists would have the emotional capacity to bring a civil
action for damages. However, Ms. Lopez intervenes at a very early stage, when her physi-
cal presence, and that of police officers, is necessary to shield a woman from violence
that may be life-threatenting. Interview with Elba Lopez, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 23,
1991).
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the torts of battery and assault.87 Sections 13 and 18 provide for liabil-
ity for battery if an actor intends "to cause a harmful or offensive con-
tact [with another] or an imminent apprehension of such a contact,"88
and a harmful 9 or offensive"0 contact results. Section 21 provides for
liability for assault if an actor "acts intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact [with another] or an imminent apprehension of such
a contact, and . . . the other is thereby put in such imminent
apprehension." 91
A battery may be committed by indirect force, such as placing in
motion a force or object that makes harmful or offensive contact with
the victim, and contact may be "with anything so connected with the
body as to be customarily regarded as part of the other's person and
therefore as partaking of its inviolability." 92 The plaintiff need not be
aware of the contact at the time the actor inflicted it,9" and contact is
deemed to be harmful if there is "any physical impairment of the con-
dition of another's body, or physical pain or illness. '94 "[C]ontact is
offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity."9 5
Unlike battery, the tort of assault requires awareness. 96 The requi-
site apprehension occurs when the victim "believe[s] that the act may
result in imminent contact unless prevented from so resulting by the
[victim's] self-defensive action or by his flight or by the intervention of
some outside force."97 The victim must apprehend imminent contact,
but need not be placed in fear. 8
That one who is aware that she is about to suffer a battery will
have suffered an assault demonstrates the complementary nature of
the two torts. Damages caused by a battery consist of physical injury
and emotional pain and suffering. Damages caused by an assault con-
sist of "mental disturbance, including fright, humiliation and the like,
as well as any physical illness which may result from them." 99 Punitive
damages are available for both torts under appropriate
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13 cmt. a, 18 cmt. a (1977); see W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 9-10, at 39-46 (5th ed.
1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13(a) (1977).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 18(1)(b).
91. Id. § 21(1)(a)-(b).
92. Id. § 18 cmt. c.
93. Id. cmt. d.
94. Id. § 15.
95. Id. § 19.
96. Id. § 22,
97. Id. § 24.
98. Id. cmt. b.
99. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 87, § 10, at 43 (footnote omitted).
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circumstances. 100
Domestic abuse often involves physical harm that will support a
battery action and awareness of imminent physical harm that will sup-
port an assault action. In addition, it typically involves purposeful in-
fliction of severe emotional harm and presents a prototype setting for
use of the tort action of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
This tort received recognition as an actionable form of conduct in sec-
tion 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.10 1 A comprehensive revi-
sion of this section appeared in the 1965 Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which requires intentional or reckless conduct, extreme and out-
rageous in nature, that results in severe emotional distress. 102 Nor-
mally, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had an intent to inflict
severe emotional distress; however, courts occasionally rely on a reck-
lessness standard rather than an actual intent standard. Although
courts require proof of severe emotional distress, juries may consider
the character of the defendant's conduct to determine whether the
plaintiff suffered emotional harm. 03 Therefore, evidence of physical or
100. Id. § 9, at 40-41 (citations omitted); id. § 10, at 43.
101. A prior version of the Restatement, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1948), provided: "One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emo-
tional distress to another is liable (a) for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm
resulting from it." Id. This provision reversed the earlier approach, RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 46 (1934), which denied recovery for "conduct which is intended or which
though not so intended is likely to cause only a mental or emotional disturbance to an-
other." Id.
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). The section reads in its en-
tirety as follows:
Section 46. Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to
liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress (a) to
a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time,
whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person
who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm.
Id. § 46.
For a discussion of the early development of the tort action and the Restatement
response, see Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982); P.R. Handford, Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress:
Analysis of the Growth of a Tort, 8 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 1 (1979); Willard H. Pedrick,
Intentional Infliction: Should Section 46 Be Revised?, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 1 (1985); William
L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MIcH. L. REV. 874
(1939).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1977) ("Severe distress must be
proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's con-
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objective manifestations of emotional distress is not technically re-
quired, but it has significant probative value.104 Despite the arguably
vague phrase "extreme and outrageous conduct," courts and juries in
different jurisdictions have acted with substantial uniformity in distin-
guishing between actionable conduct and "mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities."10 5 Com-
ment d to section 46 supports this position.
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all pos-
sible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in
which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the commu-
nity would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, "Outrageous!"106
Applying this extreme and outrageous conduct standard, courts
and juries have uniformly denied recovery for emotional distress when
the claim is based on wrongful discharge of an employee,.0 7 failure by
an insurance company to pay claims,108 false arrest by police officers, 09
and financial, commercial, and real estate disputes. 10 Recovery is
duct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed."). Comment j further
states, "The distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there
is no liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional
distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of which the actor
has knowledge." Id. (citing id. cmt. f).
104. See id. cmt. k.
105. Id. cmt. d.
106. Id.
107. E.g., Webb v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 571 (Ark. 1989);
Sterling v. Upjohn Healthcare Servs., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 329 (Ark. 1989); Harris v. Arkan-
sas Book Co., 700 S.W.2d 41 (Ark. 1985); Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372 N.W.2d
193 (Iowa 1985) (en bane); Staples v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 561 A.2d 499 (Me. 1989);
Madani v. Kendall Ford, Inc., 818 P.2d 930 (Or. 1991) (en banc); Sheets v. Knight, 779
P.2d 1000 (Or. 1989); Gearhart v. Employment Div. of Dep't of Human Resources, 783
P.2d 536 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc), review denied, 792 P.2d 104 (Or. 1990); Sperber
v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1987); Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002 (Wash.
1989) (en banc). But see Cagle v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 726 P.2d 434 (Wash. 1986) (en banc)
(holding that wrongful termination in violation of public policy is compensable inten-
tional tort).
108. See D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966
(Pa. 1981); Demag v. American Ins. Cos., 508 A.2d 697 (Vt. 1986).
109. E.g., State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc); Nelson v. City of Las
Vegas, 665 P.2d 1141 (Nev. 1983) (per curiam).
110. E.g., McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. 1988); Steckelberg v. Randolph,
448 N.W.2d 458 (Iowa 1989); Tomash v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 399 N.W.2d 387
(Iowa 1987); Butler v. Poulin, 500 A.2d 257 (Me. 1985); Buckley v. Trenton Say. Fund
Soc'y, 544 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1988); Groseth Int'l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 276
(S.D. 1989).
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likely, however, in cases that involve sexual abuse of children,111 sexual
assault against adults,11 2 sexual harassment of employees, 13 threats
against a person's life,1 14 serious interference with visitation or custody
rights of parents,"' extreme forms of harassment by debt collectors,
118
interference with funeral services,117 forcible and illegal eviction of te-
nants,1 ' transmission of genital herpes,119 extortion,"2° repeated ob-
scene phone calls, 21 continuous and highly insulting or threatening be-
havior, 2 beatings, 23 and threats of future beatings.3"
4
Subsection 46(2) of the Restatement addresses liability for harm
to one person because of conduct directed at another person. 125 This
derivative liability is limited by the requirement that the plaintiff must
actually suffer severe emotional distress. Most of the cases that have
permitted recovery derived from harm to a third party have involved
sexual abuse of a child126 or sexual assault upon a spouse."27 Finally,
comment e to section 46 notes that "[t]he extreme and outrageous
character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a
position, or relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent
111. Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789 (Alaska 1987) (finding that parents of abused
child stated claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Reagan v. Rider, 521
A.2d 1246 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (affirming award for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress against stepfather for long-term sexual abuse of stepdaughter); Nancy P.
v. D'Amato, 517 N.E.2d 824 (Mass. 1988) (affirming judgment for intentional infliction of
emotional distress for abused child and denial of recovery on same claim by mother and
brother of child).
112. McCalla v. Ellis, 341 N.W.2d 525 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Mindt v. Shavers, 337
N.W.2d 97 (Neb. 1983).
113. Bowersox v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 677 F. Supp. 307 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Chamberlin
v. 101 Realty, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 865 (D.N.H. 1985); Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F.
Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (mem.); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987) (en
banc); O'Connell v. Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349 (Mass. 1987); Hogan v. Forsyth Country
Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 346 S.E.2d 140 (N.C.), and
review denied, 346 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. 1986).
114. E.g., Teamsters Local 959 v. Wells, 749 P.2d 349 (Alaska 1988).
115. E.g., Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431 (Vt. 1978).
116. E.g., Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, Inc., 568 P.2d 1382 (Or. 1977).
117. E.g., Cates v. Taylor, 428 So. 2d 637 (Ala. 1983); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d
911 (Iowa 1976).
118. E.g., Brewer v. Erwin, 600 P.2d 398 (Or. 1979); Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d
696 (Utah 1985); Birkenhead v. Coombs, 465 A.2d 244 (Vt. 1983).
119. B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1988).
120. E.g., Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d 855 (Okla. 1987).
121. E.g., Ruple v. Brooks, 352 N.W.2d 652 (S.D. 1984).
122. E.g., Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 1981).
123. See, e.g., Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d 855 (Okla. 1987).
124. E.g., Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. 1981).
125. For the text of subsection 46(2), see supra note 102.
126. See supra note 111.
127. See supra note 112.
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authority over the other, or power to affect his interests."'2 s
The approach of the 1965 revision has been remarkably infectious.
As of 1964 the highest courts of eight states had recognized the tort.129
From 1965 through 1991 the highest courts of an additional thirty-
seven states and the District of Columbia recognized the tort.130 The
highest courts of two states, Michigan and Montana, have not formally
recognized the tort, but have used section 46 principles in ways that
suggest that the tort action will receive formal approval in the near
future. 131 The Texas Supreme Court has neither expressly recognized
nor rejected the tort. However, lower court opinions in Texas reflect a
general recognition of the tort.132 Mississippi has not formally recog-
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1977).
129. Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 59 S.E. 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907); State Rub-
bish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952) (en banc); Fraser v. Morrison,
39 Haw. 370 (1952); Savage v. Boies, 272 P.2d 349 (Ariz. 1954); Browning v. Slenderella
Sys., 341 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1959) (en banc); Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157 (III. 1961);
Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961); Alsteen v. Gehl, 124 N.W.2d 312 (Wis.
1963).
130. Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 398 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. 1966); Weicker v. Weicker,
237 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1968) (per curiam); Pakos v. Clark, 453 P.2d 682 (Or. 1969); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bragdon, 167 N.W.2d 381 (S.D. 1969); Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d 753
(Colo. 1970) (en banc); George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1971); Ams-
den v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972); Hiers v. Cohen, 329
A.2d 609 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973); Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145 (Va. 1974); Daw-
son v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., 529 P.2d 104 (Kan. 1974); Paasch v. Brown, 227 N.W.2d
402 (Neb. 1975); Eakman v. Robb, 237 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975); Dean v. Chapman, 556
P.2d 257 (Okla. 1976); Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977); Sheltra v. Smith, 392
A.2d 431 (Vt. 1978); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979); Stan-
back v. Stanback, 254 S.E.2d 611 (N.C. 1979); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest,
606 P.2d 944 (Idaho 1980); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681 (Ark. 1980); Waldon
v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070 (D.C. 1980); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); American Road Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d
361 (Ala. 1980); Hume v. Bayer, 428 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981); Star v.
Rabello, 625 P.2d 90 (Nev. 1981); Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 1981); Domini-
quez v. Stone, 638 P.2d 423 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289
S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983); Yeager v.
Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1983); Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1984);
Champlin v. Washington Trust Co., 478 A.2d 985 (R.I. 1984); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985); Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705
P.2d 454 (Alaska 1985); Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986);
McKnight v. Voshell, 513 A.2d 1319 (Del. 1986) (text in Westlaw); Kazatsky v. King
David Memorial Park, 527 A.2d 988 (Pa. 1987); Morancy v. Morancy, 593 A.2d 1158
(N.H. 1991); White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1991).
131. See Fulghum v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 378 N.W.2d 472 (Mich. 1985); Rob-
erts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 905 (Mich. 1985); Day v. Montana Power Co.,
789 P.2d 1224 (Mont. 1990).
132. See Holloway v. Browning, 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981) (per curiam); Stevenson
v. Koutzarov, 795 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tax. Ct. App. 1990); Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d
652, 657-58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), revod on other grounds, 803 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1991).
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nized the tort, but references to the tort in recent cases indicate that
the tort is available.133 Indiana is the only state that has expressly re-
jected the tort.13'
Therefore, it appears that the tort is available in the District of
Columbia and all states except Indiana. Among the jurisdictions in
which the tort is available, all but five apply section 46 principles with-
out modification. Delaware, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin modify one
of the elements of section 46.135 Georgia and Hawaii use approaches
that are based upon early state decisions that recognize the tort.3 '
The four interchangeable names used to describe the tort are in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of
mental distress, tort of outrage, and tort of outrageous conduct. The
name intentional infliction of emotional distress predominates, espe-
cially in recent cases. Regardless of the name used by the state courts,
however, the elements of the tort remain the same.
III. INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY DocTRINE
The early common law barred tort actions between married per-
sons in both England and the United States.1 '7 Originally, the immu-
nity of one spouse from a tort action by the other was based upon "the
common law doctrine of the legal identity of husband and wife. '138 A
husband owned his wife's causes of action. 39 Therefore, if a husband
133. See Benjamin v. Hooper Elec. Supply Co., 568 So. 2d 1182 (Miss. 1990); Cum-
berland v. Cumberland, 564 So. 2d 839, 842-43 (Miss. 1990); City of Mound Bayou v.
Johnson, 562 So. 2d 1212, 1217-18 (Miss. 1990); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bristow, 529
So. 2d 620, 624 (Miss. 1988) (en banc).
134. See Elza v. Liberty Loan Corp., 426 N.E.2d 1302 (Ind. 1981) (Hunter, J.,
dissenting).
135. See McNight v. Voshell, 513 A.2d 1319 (Del. 1986) (text in Westlaw) (holding
that "bodily harm [must] result"); Curtis v. Department for Children & Their Families,
522 A.2d 203, 208 (R.I. 1987) (holding that "physical ills" must accompany the "mental
anguish"); Alsteen v. Gehl, 124 N.W.2d 312, 318 (Wis. 1963) (requiring an "extreme disa-
bling emotional response to the defendant's conduct").
136. In East River Savings Bank v. Steele, 311 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983), cert.
denied, 311 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. 1984), the court wrote that "'defendant's actions [must be]
so terrifying or insulting as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.'"
Id. at 190-91 (quoting Georgia Power Co. v. Johnson, 274 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. Ct. App.
1980)). Hawaii requires that the acts of defendants be "intentional" and "unreasonable"
and that the defendants "should have recognized their conduct as likely to result in ill-
ness." Chedester v. Stecker, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (Haw. 1982). However, the word "unrea-
sonable" has been interpreted as meaning the same thing as the § 46 word "outrageous."
See id.
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. a (1977).
138. Id. cmt. b.
139. Id.
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committed a tort against his wife, he would actually own the cause of
action against himself. Similarly, he was liable for torts committed by
his wife. Therefore, if she committed a tort against him, he would be
personally liable for the tort against himself. The immunity doctrine
avoided these unreasonable results.1
40
Married women gained separate legal identity and rights to own
property as a result of married women's acts, enacted in all jurisdic-
tions beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century.14 1 As a result
the courts permitted actions between spouses that related to property
interests. However, interspousal immunity from suit was retained for
actions involving invasion of personal rights.1 42 Courts justified the re-
tention of the doctrine for negligence actions and intentional torts such
as battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress on
the questionable ground that "personal tort actions between husband
and wife would disrupt and destroy the peace and harmony of the
home.' '143 Courts also were concerned about the "possibility of trivial
actions for petty annoyances 1 4' and collusion between spouses that
would lead to "fictitious or fraudulent claims."
45
Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have eliminated
interspousal immunity.146 Among the eleven states that have retained
interspousal immunity, only four 47 bar all forms of action. Two
states 4" have abolished interspousal immunity for negligence actions,
but have retained it for intentional torts. Three states 4 9 have abol-
ished interspousal immunity for negligence actions arising out of auto-
mobile accidents, but have retained it for other negligence actions and
intentional torts. One state'50 has abolished interspousal immunity for
intentional torts, but has retained it for negligence actions. Finally, one
state 1 51 has abolished interspousal immunity for the tort of battery,
but has retained it for other intentional torts and for negligence
actions.
Thus, the interspousal immunity doctrine bars tort actions for bat-
tery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in domes-
140. Id.
141. Id. cmt. c.
142. See id.
143. Id. cmt. d.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See infra note 154.
147. These states are Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, and Louisiana. See id.
148. These states are Alaska and Massachusetts. See id.
149. These states are Nevada, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See id.
150. Utah. See id.
151. Florida. See id.
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tic abuse cases in nine states. 152 However, such actions generally are
permissible in these states after dissolution of a marriage, based upon
tortious conduct that occurred during the marriage. 5 3 Therefore, in
these states tort actions by married victims of domestic abuse are
barred during marriage, but the interspousal immunity doctrine has no
effect upon civil actions for domestic abuse between unmarried or for-
merly married persons.1
5
4
152. Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, Rhode
Island, and Vermont. See id. In Utah only battery actions are permitted.
153. E.g., Duplechin v. Toce, 497 So. 2d 763 (La. Ct. App. 1986), writ denied, 499
So. 2d 86 (La. 1987); Nogueira v. Nogueira, 444 N.E.2d 940 (Mass. 1983). Contra Stan-
field v. Stanfield, 371 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Counts v. Counts, 266 S.E.2d 895
(Va. 1980).
154. The following is the current status of the interspousal immunity doctrine in the
United States:
District of Columbia: Abolished. D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-201 (1988) (effective in 1976);
see Turner v. Taylor, 471 A.2d 1010, 1012, n.2 (D.C. 1984). Alabama: Abolished. Johnson
v. Johnson, 77 So. 335 (Ala. 1917); see Coleman v. Coleman, 566 So. 2d 482 (Ala. 1990)
(per curiam). Alaska: Abolished with respect to negligence actions. Cramer v. Cramer,
379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963). Arizona: Abolished. Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878, 883
(Ariz. 1982) (en banc). Arkansas: Abolished. Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957).
California: Abolished with respect to negligence actions, Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70 (Cal.
1962) (en banc), and with respect to intentional torts, Self v. Self, 376 P.2d 65 (Cal.
1962) (en banc).
Colorado: Abolished with respect to negligence actions, Rains v. Rains, 46 P.2d 740,
743 (Colo. 1935), and with respect to intentional torts, Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d
602, 603-04 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. 1989). Connecticut:
Abolished with respect to intentional torts, Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889 (Conn. 1914), and
with respect to negligence actions, Bushnell v. Bushnell, 131 A. 432, 433 (Conn. 1925).
Delaware: Reaffirmed. Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161 (Del. 1979) (per curiam), appeal
dismissed, 446 U.S. 931 (1980). Florida: Abolished with respect to battery. FLA. STAT.
ANN. ch. 741.235 (Harrison Supp. 1989). Retained for other torts. See Sturiano v. Brooks,
523 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 1988) (citing Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
475 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1985)); Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 886 (1980). Georgia: Retained generally. See Robeson v. International Indem.
Co., 282 S.E.2d 896, 898 (Ga. 1981).
Hawaii: Retained. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572-28 (Michie 1988); see Campo v.
Taboada, 720 P.2d 181 (Haw. 1986) (citing former code section); Peters v. Peters, 634
P.2d 586 (Haw. 1981) (upholding statute's constitutionality). Idaho: Abolished. Lorang v.
Hays, 209 P.2d 733, 737 (Idaho 1949) (community property case); see Rogers v. Yellow-
stone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566, 569 (Idaho 1975). Illinois: Abolished. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
40, para. 1001 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (effective 1986). Indiana: Abolished. Brooks v.
Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. 1972). Iowa: Abolished. Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d
616 (Iowa 1979) (en banc); see McIntosh v. Barr, 397 N.W.2d 516, 517 (Iowa 1986).
Kansas: Abolished. Flagg v. Loy, 734 P.2d 1183 (Kan. 1987). Kentucky: Abolished.
Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953). Louisiana: Retained. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:291 (West 1991). Maine: Abolished. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me.
1980). Maryland: Abolished with respect to negligence actions, Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462
A.2d 506, 515 (Md. Ct. App. 1983), and with respect to "outrageous intentional torts,"
Lusby v. Lusby, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (Md. Ct. App. 1978). The dissenting opinion in Walther
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IV, JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF TORT ACTIONS IN DOMESTIC ABUSE
CASES
Civil actions for battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emo-
v, Allstate Insurance Co., 575 A.2d 339 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989), cert. denied, 580 A.2d
219 (Md. 1990), referred to interspousal immunity as "fully abrogated." Id. at 344 n.2
(Boll, J., dissenting).
Massachusetts: Abolished for motor vehicle accidents. Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d
526 (Mass. 1976). This abrogation was applied retroactively in Pevoski v. Pevoski, 358
N.E.2d 416, 418 (Mass. 1976), and was extended to other negligence actions in Brown v.
Brown, 409 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Mass. 1980). Michigan: Abolished. Hosko v. Hosko, 187
N.W.2d 236 (Mich. 1971) (per curiam). Minnesota: Abolished. Beaudette v. Frana, 173
N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969). Mississippi: Abolished. Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205, 1211
(Miss. 1938) (en banc); see Cain v. McKinnon, 552 So. 2d 91, 93 (Miss. 1989) (stating
that the Burns rule is applied prospectively). Missouri: Abolished with respect to inten-
tional torts, Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), and with
respect to negligence actions, S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
Montana: Abolished. Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P.2d 342, 345 (Mont. 1986); see
Noone v. Fink, 721 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Mont. 1986). Nebraska: Abolished. Imig v. March,
279 N.W.2d 382 (Neb. 1979). Nevada: Abolished only in motor vehicle accident tort
claims. Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Nev. 1974). New Hampshire: Abolished.
Gilman v. Gilman, 95 A. 657 (N.H. 1915). New Jersey: Abolished. Merenoff v. Merenoff,
388 A,2d 951, 962 (N.J. 1978); see Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189 (N.J. 1979).
New Mexico: Abolished with respect to negligence actions, Maestas v. Overton, 531
P.2d 947 (N.M. 1975), and with respect to intentional torts, Flores v. Flores, 506 P.2d
345, 346 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 506 P.2d 336 (N.M. 1973). New York: Abolished.
See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-313.2 (McKinney 1989).
North Carolina: Abolished. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1991). North Dakota: Abolished.
Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526 (N.D. 1932). Ohio: Abolished. Shearer v.
Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 394 (Ohio 1985).
Oklahoma: Abolished. Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660 (Okla. 1938); see White v.
White, 618 P.2d 921, 924 (Okla. 1980); Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 140 P. 1022 (Okla. 1914). Ore-
gon: Abolished with respect to negligence actions, Heino v. Harper, 759 P.2d 253 (Or.
1988), as applied retroactively, Antonnaci v. Davis, 816 P.2d 1202 (Or. Ct. App. 1991),
and with respect to intentional torts, Apitz v. Dames, 287 P.2d 585 (Or. 1955). Pennsyl-
vania: Abolished. Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859 (Pa. 1981). But see Dercoli v. Pennsylva-
nia Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 554 A.2d 906, 907 (Pa. 1989) (suggesting that Hack is limited to
negligence actions). Rhode Island: Abolished only with respect to motor vehicle accident
tort claims. Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d 1, 4 (R.I. 1978); see Asplin v. Anica Mut. Ins. Co.,
394 A.2d 1353, 1355 (R.L 1978) (holding that defense of interspousal immunity not avail-
able if one of spouses has died). South Carolina: Abolished with respect to negligence
actions, Pardue v. Pardue, 166 S.E. 101 (1932), and with respect to intentional torts,
Prosser v. Prosser, 102 S.E. 787 (S.C. 1920).
South Dakota: Abolished. Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758, 763 (S.D. 1989)
(citing Aus v. Carper, 151 N.W.2d 611 (S.D. 1967); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298 NW. 266
(S.D. 1941)). Tennessee: Abolished. Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983). Texas:
Abolished. Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987). Utah: Abolished with respect
to intentional torts. Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980); see also Noble v. Noble,
761 P.2d 1369, 1375 n.7 (Utah 1988) (reaffirming that Stoker did not address negligence
actions). Vermont: Abolished only with respect to motor vehicle accident tort claims.
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tional distress are effective, victim-controlled means for obtaining rem-
edy and discouraging future abusive conduct, especially if there is no
existing marital relationship. Research for this Article revealed, how-
ever, an astonishing underutilization of these civil causes of action.
Among approximately 2600 reported state cases of battery, assault, or
both, from 1981 through 1990,155 only fifty-three involved adult parties
in domestic relationships. 15 Similarly, during the same time frame,
only four reported federal cases involved a claim or counterclaim be-
tween adult parties in a domestic relationship. 5 7 From 1958 through
1990 slightly more than 6000 intentional infliction of emotional distress
cases were reported from all state and federal courts."" Evaluation of
these cases revealed a total of eighteen' 59 in which courts have applied
the tort action to a domestic abuse fact pattern. The infrequent use of
tort actions reflects surprising reluctance by lawyers to use civil actions
for damages in domestic abuse cases, even though the judicial response
to such cases has been overwhelmingly favorable.6
0
Richard v. Richard, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (Vt. 1973).
Virginia: Abolished. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1 (Michie 1984) (effective July 1,
1981). Washington: Abolished. Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972) (en banc),
overruled on other grounds by Brown v. Brown 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1984). West Vir-
ginia: Abolished. Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (W. Va. 1978). Wis-
consin: Abolished. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.075 (West 1981) (effective in 1947). Wyo-
ming: Abolished. Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 1987).
155. These results were obtained from the West Publishing Company's Westlaw
computer-assisted research service.
156. See infra Appendix.
157. These four cases are listed under "Federal Courts" in the Appendix to this
Article. The scarcity of domestic abuse cases in federal courts should not be surprising.
In such cases federal court jurisdiction almost certainly would be based upon diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
158. The terms "intentional infliction of emotional distress," "intentional infliction
of mental distress," "tort of outrage," and "tort of outrageous conduct" were used for the
computer-assisted search that created this result.
159. See Lewis v. Lennox, 567 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1990); Simmons v. Simmons, 773
P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. 1989); Kukla v. Kukla,
540 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1989); Caron v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178 (Me. 1990); McCoy v. Cooke, 419 N.W.2d 44
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Hass-
ing v. Wortman, 333 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 1983); Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457
(App. Div. 1985); Baron v. Jeffer, 469 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1983) (mem.); Hallo v.
Lurie, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (App. Div. 1961); Floyd v. Dodson, 692 P.2d 77 (Okla. Ct. App.
1984); Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Chiles v. Chiles, 779
S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988); Criss v.
Criss, 356 S.E.2d 620 (W. Va. 1987); Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9 (Wis. 1974); Stuart v.
Stuart, 410 N.W.2d 632 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), affirmed, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988).
These cases are discussed in more detail in the Appendix to this Article.
160. California case law from 1981 through 1990 demonstrates the underutilization
of tort actions in domestic abuse cases. During this ten-year period California courts
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A complication arises if a tort action relates to domestic abuse
among married persons, especially if there is a pending matrimonial
action. New York apparently limits availability of the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, but not other torts, in domestic
abuse cases involving married persons. In the 1968 case of Weicker v.
Weicker161 the New York Court of Appeals rejected an intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress claim by a woman who sought a declara-
tory judgment that the Mexican divorce obtained by her husband, Sen-
ator Lowell Weicker, was invalid and sought an injunction prohibiting
him and his new wife from holding themselves out in public as hus-
band and wife. The court stated:
Assuming that New York law now permits "recovery for the inten-
tional infliction of mental distress without proof of the breach of any
duty other than the duty to refrain from inflicting it" strong policy
considerations militate against judicially applying these recent devel-
opments in this area of the law to the factual context of a dispute
arising out of matrimonial differences.Y
1 2
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court applied
the Weicker holding in an assault and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress case that involved live-in lovers.1 13 The court dismissed
the assault claim because the one-year statute of limitations had ex-
pired. The court also dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim because "it would be contrary to public policy to recog-
nize the existence of this type of tort in the context of disputes, as
here, arising out of the differences which occur betwe6n persons who,
although not married, have been living together as husband and
wife.,,16
heard one battery and assault case involving domestic abuse between adults. See Alder-
son v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Ct. App.), review denied, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1986).
During the same period the courts heard six sexual assault cases that related to child
sexual abuse by a father, stepfather, foster father, or step-grandfather. In re Venus B.,
272 Cal. Rptr. 115 (Ct. App. 1990) (stepfather); Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605
(Ct. App. 1990) (foster father); Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Ct. App. 1989)
(father), review granted, 788 P.2d 1155 (Cal.), and review dismissed, 800 P.2d 858 (Cal.
1990); Colleen L. v. Howard M., 257 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Ct. App. 1989) (stepfather); Pease v.
Pease, 246 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Ct. App. 1988) (grandfather); DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal.
Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1987) (step-grandfather), review denied, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal.
1988). Because spousal abuse or abuse among adults in a domestic relationship occurs
more frequently than sexual abuse of children by family members, the scarcity of spousal
abuse cases compared with child sexual abuse cases illustrates the underutilization of
torts actions in spousal abuse cases.
161. 237 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1968) (per curiam).
162. Id. at 876-77 (citations omitted).
163. Baron v. Jeffer, 469 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1983).
164. Id. at 817. In Eller v. Eller, 524 N.Y.S.2d 93 (App. Div. 1988) (mem.), the Ap-
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New Jersey permits tort actions based upon domestic abuse among
married persons, but requires joinder of tort claims in pending divorce
actions. In Tevis v. Tevis 65 the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded
in dicta that a woman who allegedly had suffered a serious beating by
her former husband should have raised any tort claim she had in her
divorce proceedings. Because the tort action and its potential for mon-
etary damages were relevant to the divorce proceeding, the claim
"should, under the 'single controversy' doctrine, have been presented
in conjunction with [the divorce action] as part of the overall dispute
between the parties in order to lay at rest all their legal differences in
one proceeding and avoid the prolongation and fractionalization of
litigation."1 66
By contrast, a more recent decision by a New Jersey lower court in
Brown v. Brown16 7 concluded that the entire controversy doctrine did
not bar a wife's tort action against her husband for a battery that oc-
curred during the pendency of their divorce action. The court stated
that although joinder would have been required if the tort had oc-
pellate Division of the New York Supreme Court relied upon Weicker in dismissing the
former wife's counterclaim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in an action by
the former husband against her for absconding with the children, of whom the husband
had custody. The court stated, "Strong policy considerations have been held to militate
against allowing recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in matters
arising out of the interpersonal relationships in a matrimonial context." Id. at 94. By
contrast, the court in Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457 (App. Div. 1985), awarded
damages in the amount of $45,000 to a woman for intentional infliction of emotional
distress by a man with whom she had lived. The court referred to the defendant's
"threats, use of force, assaults upon and general abusive conduct toward plaintiff," id. at
458-59, and his "deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment," id. at 459. The court
allowed the claim because the acts of the defendant that caused the plaintiff's emotional
distress occurred after the termination of the live-in relationship. The approach in Mur-
phy is consistent with the two earliest lower court cases that recognized the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress in New York. In Mitran v. Williamson, 197
N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup. Ct. 1960), the defendant solicited illicit sex with the plaintiff and
sent photos of his private parts to her. The trial court held that "[a] jury under all of the
circumstances in this case could find defendant's conduct so shocking that plaintiff, as
alleged, suffered severe emotional disturbance and resulting physical injuries for which
defendant would be liable." Id. at 690. In Halio v. Lurie, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (App. Div.
1961), the plaintiff and the defendant had dated for two years, with plans of marriage.
He married another woman, concealed the marriage from the plaintiff while continuing
to see her, wrote a sarcastic letter to the plaintiff ridiculing her, and caused her emo-
tional harm. The appellate division concluded that a cause of action exists in New York
for "the intentional infliction of serious mental distress without physical impact." Id. at
762. In this case it was "for the trier of the facts to determine whether such injuries were
actually suffered, and whether the conduct of the defendant was such that it may be said
that it went beyond all reasonable bounds of decency." Id. at 764 (citations omitted).
165. 400 A.2d 1189 (N.J. 1979).
166. Id. at 1196 (citations omitted).
167. 506 A.2d 29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
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curred prior to commencement of the divorce action, the entire contro-
versy doctrine did not require joinder because "this tort claim is suffi-
ciently distinct and independent from the cause of action for divorce
and equitable distribution to permit separate adjudication." s
Other jurisdictions have rejected the approach of New Jersey and
have approved the use of tort actions for domestic abuse independent
of divorce proceedings. In McCoy v. Cooke 89 a woman sued her former
husband for acts of physical assault and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress that occurred while they were married. The trial court
in the divorce proceeding found that the defendant had repeatedly
battered the plaintiff.17 0 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that res
judicata did not bar the plaintiff from pursuing her tort action sepa-
rately from the divorce.17' However, collateral estoppel prevented the
defendant from denying that the batteries occurred, although he could
"raise as an affirmative defense the issue whether and to what extent
the divorce judgment compensated plaintiff for any injuries she suf-
fered as a result of the batteries.'
7 2
Similarly, in Stuart v. Stuart17 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
concluded that a woman could sue her former husband three months
after the parties received a divorce for assault, battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress that allegedly occurred during the mar-
riage. The court agreed with the lower court that "although joinder of
an interspousal tort action and a divorce action is permissible, it is
contrary to public policy to require such a joinder.'
7 4
168. Id. at 35. Interestingly, the court added the following statement: "Indeed, there
is apparently some uncertainty as to how a marital tort claim joined with a traditional
divorce action should be tried." Id. (citation omitted).
169. 419 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
170. Id. at 46.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988).
174. Id. at 508. The Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted with approval the following
excerpt from the court of appeals opinion:
"If an abused spouse cannot commence a tort action subsequent to a di-
vorce, the spouse will be forced to elect between three equally unacceptable
alternatives: (1) Commence a tort action during the marriage and possibly en-
dure additional abuse; (2) join a tort claim in a divorce action and waive the
right to a jury trial on the tort claim; or (3) commence an action to terminate
the marriage, forego the tort claim, and surrender the right to recover damages
arising from spousal abuse. To enforce such an election would require an
abused spouse to surrender both the constitutional right to a jury trial and
valuable property rights to preserve his or her well-being. This the law will not
do.
Although joinder is permissible, the administration of justice is better
served by keeping tort and divorce actions separate. . . . Divorce actions will
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The Colorado Court of Appeals in Simmons v. Simmons" 5 consid-
ered the assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claims of a woman who alleged that her former husband threw
coffee on her and "kicked, slapped, and hit her, and tore her ear."
17
The court held that public policy precludes joinder of interspousal tort
claims with dissolution of marriage proceedings. 7 7 Similarly, in Chiles
v. Chiles17 8 the Texas Court of Appeals reversed a $500,000 judgment
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. There was a jury finding
that the plaintiff's former husband subjected her to "'physical and
verbal abuse, harassment, threats and generally provocative conduct'"
that caused severe emotional distress. 179 The plaintiff obtained the tort
claim judgment as part of a divorce action, and the Texas Court of
Appeals concluded that the tort claim "should not be recognized in a
divorce action."8 0 The court reasoned that "in the unique and special
setting of a lawsuit for divorce, [an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress without proof of physical injury] would tend to ob-
fuscate the issues of custody, support and division of community
property."''
In Coleman v. Coleman'82 the Alabama Supreme Court found that
become unduly complicated if tort claims must be litigated in the same action.
... [R]equiring joinder of tort claims in a divorce action could unduly
lengthen the period of time before a spouse could obtain a divorce and result
in such adverse consequences as delayed child custody and support
determinations."
Id. (quoting Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W.2d 632, 637-38 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), affirmed, 421
N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988)).
175. 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. 1989).
176. Id. at 603.
177. Id. at 605.
[Tihe efficient administration of dissolution cases requires their insulation
from the peculiarities of matters at law. The joinder of marriage dissolution
actions with claims sounding in tort or, for instance, contract would require
our trial courts to address many extraneous issues, including trial by jury, and
the difference between the "amicable settlement of disputes that have arisen
between parties to a marriage," and the adversarial nature of other types of
civil cases. Moreover, such would create tension between the acceptance of
contingent fees in tort claims and our strong and longstanding public policy
against contingent fees in domestic cases. We conclude that sound policy con-
siderations preclude either permissive or compulsory joinder of interspousal
tort claims, or non-related contract claims, with dissolution of marriage
proceedings.
Id. at 604-05 (citations omitted).
178. 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
179. Id. at 131.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 132.
182. 566 So. 2d 482 (Ala. 1990) (per curiam).
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the settlement agreement executed by the parties in the divorce action
barred the wife from bringing a subsequent tort action against the hus-
band for transmission of a venereal disease during the marriage be-
cause the wife knew of her infection prior to her release of all claims in
the settlement agreement. The court described the ways in which a
spouse could preserve a tort claim.
First, if the spouse does not intend a release of all known claims, he or
she could expressly reserve a tort claim from the settlement and then
subsequently sue in tort. Second, the divorce defendant could coun-
terclaim with a demand for damages based upon any tort claims or
the spouse plaintiff could also include a tort claim in the divorce case.
Because trial by jury is not provided for in divorce actions in Ala-
bama, the trial court could sever the claim for damages and set the
severed case for a jury trial.83
Coleman was similar to an earlier Alabama case, Smith v.
Smith.18 4 The wife brought an independent action for assault and bat-
tery against her husband. She alleged that one of the beatings ruptured
a disc, requiring surgical fusion. The court barred the independent tort
action because "the parties entered into extensive settlement negotia-
tions and . . . central to those negotiations was the fact that Mrs.
Smith had injuries resulting from the marriage and had need to be
compensated in some way for those injuries."'
85
Courts have permitted, or required, independent tort and matri-
monial actions, but have barred recovery in tort actions if recovery for
tortious conduct was obtained in matrimonial actions. In Kemp v.
Kemp'86 the court barred an independent tort action by a woman
whose husband shattered her nose when he struck her with his fist. She
previously had raised the tort claim in her divorce proceeding and re-
ceived damages for her injuries. Thus, res judicata barred the action
because she was attempting to litigate the same cause of action a sec-
ond time. 8 7 In Nash v. Overholser88 the plaintiff could have litigated
her assault and battery claims as part of her divorce proceedings, but
the court did not require her to do so. The court recognized that
"[d]ivorce proceedings should be handled expeditiously and with a
183. Id. at 485-86 (footnote omitted).
184. 530 So. 2d 1389 (Ala. 1988).
185. Id. at 1391; cf. Abbott v. Williams, 888 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding
that Alabama law does not require joinder of marital tort and divorce proceedings if the
issues involved are distinct).
186. 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986), appeal denied, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn.
1987).
187. Id. at 140.
188. 757 P.2d 1180 (Idaho 1988), rejected on other grounds by State v. Guzman, No.
17716, 1990 WL 178602 (Idaho Nov. 19, 1990) (unpublished opinion).
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view toward minimizing emotional trauma; such proceedings certainly
should not serve as a catalyst for additional spousal abuse."1 s9 The
court noted that the wife did not plead the tort allegations in her di-
vorce complaint, and the divorce court did not address them. 90
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Heacock v. Hea-
cock,19 ' concluded that a divorce decree did not bar a subsequent tort
action for a battery that occurred during the marriage, even though the
plaintiff presented evidence concerning the battery as part of the di-
vorce proceedings. 19 2 In Heacock the defendant allegedly went to the
residence of the plaintiff, broke a glass panel in the door when she
refused to open the door, grabbed her by the arm, and "violently pul-
led her, causing her repeatedly to strike her head against the door
frame."'I 3 The plaintiff sought money damages for physical injuries,
including spells of dizziness, blackouts, and traumatic epilepsy. 19 4 The
court expressed its reasoning as follows:
A tort action is not based on the same underlying claim as an
action for divorce. The purpose of a tort action is to redress a legal
wrong in damages; that of a divorce action is to sever the marital rela-
tionship between the parties, and, where appropriate, to fix the par-
ties' respective rights and obligations with regard to alimony and sup-
port, and to divide the marital estate. Although a judge in awarding
alimony and dividing marital property must consider, among other
things, the conduct of the parties during the marriage, the purposes
for which these awards are made do not include compensating a party
in damages for injuries suffered.. . . The plaintiff could not have re-
covered damages for the tort in the divorce action, as the Probate
Court does not have jurisdiction to hear tort actions and award
damages. 9 5
The Indiana Court of Appeals recognized the independence of tort
and matrimonial actions in McNevin v. McNevin.9 6 The plaintiff sued
her husband in a battery action because he allegedly struck and in-
jured her during their separation. The court permitted the plaintiff's
subsequent tort action because even though the plaintiff entered into a
settlement agreement that divided marital assets without mentioning
her plan to bring a postdivorce tort action, "an inchoate, unliquidated
tort claim could not be considered by the trial court in the dissolution
189. Id. at 1181.
190. Id. at 1182.
191. 520 N.E.2d 151 (Mass. 1988).
192. Id. at 153.
193. Id. at 152.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 153 (citations omitted).
196. 447 N.E.2d 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
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proceedings (division of property). 1 '9 7 The tort claim had "no present
ascertainable value," 198 and the trial court could not have considered it
in approving the settlement had it known of the claim. Therefore, the
plaintiff's "failure to disclose the claim [did] not preclude an indepen-
dent action."10 9
Similarly, in Aubert v. Aubert 00 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire permitted a man to bring an intentional tort action against
his former wife who shot him in the face with a .38 calibre revolver. He
suffered permanent injury and disfigurement, and the court upheld an
award for $343,000 in compensatory damages. The court held that the
prior divorce decree did not bar the tort action because "a civil action
in tort is fundamentally different from a divorce proceeding, and...
the respective issues involved are entirely distinct. '20 1 Additionally,
"the divorce court [was] without jurisdiction to award damages for per-
sonal injuries.
'20 2
In Walther v. Walther20 3 the Supreme Court of Utah held that a
court may not try a tort claim as part of a divorce action.20 4 The court
quoted from an earlier Utah case in which the court expressed concern
that "'divorce actions will become unduly complicated in their trial
and disposition if torts can be or must be litigated in the same ac-
tion.' ,,20 Three years later the court in Noble v. Noble206 reaffirmed
that a divorce decree does not bar an interspousal tort claim, even if
the divorce court considered the facts relating to the tort action.
20 7
197. Id. at 618.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 529 A.2d 909 (N.H. 1987).
201. Id. at 911.
202. Id. at 912. The court also held that the criminal conviction of the wife for at-
tempted murder collaterally estopped her from litigating the issues of causation and lia-
bility in the subsequent tort action. Id. at 912-13; see supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
203. 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985).
204. Id. at 388.
205. Id. (quoting Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah 1983)). In Shaw the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant at different times during their marriage "choked her
into semi-consciousness, then pushed her out the door and off the porch[,]" "struck her
and pushed her into a wall[,]" "struck and beat her[,]... struck their minor child who
attempted to intervene," and "beat her, tore her clothes from her body, and forced her to
submit to sexual intercourse against her will." Id. at 1289. The court wrote: "A divorce
action is highly equitable in nature, whereas the trial of a tort claim is at law and may
well involve, as in this case, a request for trial by jury. The administration of justice will
be better served by keeping the two proceedings separate." Id. at 1291. The court in
Shaw dismissed the separate tort action because the statute of limitations had run.
206. 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988).
207. Id. at 1374.
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Glen Noble, age sixty-one, shot his wife Elaine in the head at close
range with a .22 calibre rifle while she lay in bed. Ms. Noble was thirty-
seven at the time and became totally and permanently disabled as a
result.20 8 The divorce court considered Ms. Noble's needs, disabilities,
and expenses that resulted from her injuries in resolving alimony and
property division issues.209 However, the state supreme court permitted
Ms. Noble to proceed with her subsequent tort action, subject to a bar
against "duplicate compensation."21 0 The court noted that as a general
rule, interspousal tort claims likely to affect a divorce action should be
resolved prior to divorce proceedings.
21'
This survey of cases demonstrates that state courts generally are
receptive to battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claims based upon domestic abuse. If the domestic abuse occurs
between married persons, joinder of tort actions in pending matrimo-
nial actions generally is not required and may be prohibited.
V. CONCLUSION
Public policy favors a vigorous response by the legal system to the
widespread problem of domestic abuse. Interspousal tort immunity
does not bar the great majority of potential actions. Moreover, most
jurisdictions prefer independent litigation of tort and divorce actions.
Tort actions for battery and assault, based upon physical injury and
threats of imminent physical injury, are as appropriate in domestic
abuse cases as they would be in a nondomestic setting. The tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress permits recovery for nonim-
minent threats and verbal abuse intended to cause severe emotional
distress.
Criminal-law and civil-law approaches have had success, but more
is needed. Successful actions for battery, assault, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress can serve as vehicles for remedy for victims
and as a reflection of societal disapproval of this particularly repugnant
form of tortious conduct.
Lawyers can make an important contribution to the national effort
to combat domestic abuse by bringing civil actions that seek money
damages for victims of domestic abuse. Divorce lawyers play a particu-
larly useful role in determining the appropriateness of tort actions on
behalf of marital dissolution clients who also are victims of domestic
abuse. These attorneys must properly coordinate tort actions and dis-
208. Id. at 1372.
209. Id. at 1370.
210. Id. at 1373.
211. Id. at 1371 & n.4.
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solution proceedings and must pay particular attention to applicable
tort statutes of limitations.
212
212. The tort actions will be subject to the normal statutes of limitations for bat-
tery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress actions.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix discusses the domestic abuse cases that involve assault and battery
claims reported from 1981 through 1990, four miscellaneous assault and battery cases
prior to 1981, and domestic abuse cases that involve intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims reported from 1958 through 1990.
District of Columbia: Granville v. Hunt, 566 A.2d 65 (D.C. 1989) (dismissing an assault
action by a woman against her former boyfriend after a seven-year delay because of her
failure to prosecute).
Alabama: Lewis v. Lennox, 567 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1990) (awarding a woman compensatory
and punitive damages in action against her former husband for assault, battery, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Smith v. Smith, 530 So. 2d 1389 (Ala. 1988)
(awarding damages for injuries in the divorce settlement agreement to a woman who
raised battery claims against her former husband during divorce proceedings); Jackson v.
Hall, 460 So. 2d 1290 (Ala. 1984) (barring a woman's independent battery action against
her former husband because the tort claim was covered by her divorce settlement); Har-
rington v. Harrington, 450 So. 2d 99 (Ala. 1984) (permitting a woman who was paralyzed
from the waist down because of a shooting by her husband to proceed in a battery action
that was independent of her divorce action); Underwood v. Hall, 572 So. 2d 490 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1990) (upholding an award of $10,000 compensatory and punitive damages for
a woman's injuries to face and body, including a broken wrist, caused by abuse from the
man with whom she had lived); Taylor v. Taylor, 560 So. 2d 768 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990)
(awarding a woman monetary damages on part of divorce proceedings for assault and
battery claims).
Arkansas: Takeya v. Didion, 745 S.W.2d 614 (Ark. 1988) (ordering a new trial because
punitive damages were awarded without compensatory damages in a case that involved a
single woman who dated a married man who beat her, threatened to kill her, and tried to
suffocate her when she attempted to end the affair); Bruns v. Bruns, 719 S.W.2d 691
(Ark. 1986) (ordering a new trial because of erroneous jury instructions in a case that
involved a battery claim by a woman who was struck from behind and pushed down her
front steps by her former husband).
California: Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Ct. App.) (awarding a woman in a
complicated child support and property division dispute between an unmarried couple
who lived together for twelve years $15,000 in compensatory and $4,000 in punitive dam-
ages for her assault and battery claim based upon an incident in which the defendant
broke her arm), review denied, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1986).
Colorado: Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (awarding a woman
$15,000 in compensatory and $100,000 in punitive damages for assault, battery, and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress claims against her former husband who kicked,
slapped, and hit her, and tore her ear), cert. denied, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. 1989).
Connecticut: Braun v. Edelstein, 554 A.2d 1102 (Conn. App. Ct.) (awarding a woman
$25,000 for physical and emotional injuries when the man with whom she shared a
nonmarital domestic relationship became angry and assaulted her with his fists), cert.
denied, 559 A.2d 1138 (Conn. 1989).
Delaware: Hudson v. Hudson, 532 A.2d 620 (Del. Super. Ct.) (holding that the inter-
spousal immunity doctrine does not bar a battery action by a woman whose husband
drove his car into a railroad sign to injure or kill her), appeal refused, 527 A.2d 281 (Del.
1987), and appeal refused, 540 A.2d 113 (Del. 1988).
Georgia: Catlett v. Catlett, 388 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App.) (awarding a woman $10,000 in
compensatory and $20,000 in punitive damages in an assault, battery, and false impris-
onment action against her former husband who struck her, prevented her from leaving
his apartment, confined her in his car, and dragged her down a stairway by her feet),
cert. denied, 388 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. 1989).
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Idaho: Nash v. Overholser, 757 P.2d 1180 (Idaho 1988) (holding that a divorce judgment
does not bar an assault and battery action by a woman who alleged that her former
husband physically attacked her on five occasions, including one in which the husband
threw her against the corner of a shower, causing permanent injury to her arm).
Illinois: Kukla v. Kukla, 540 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (requiring a woman to raise
her husband's violation of a restraining order as a part of her divorce proceedings, and
not as an independent tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, because
conduct underlying the tort action had been regulated by a previous order of the domes-
tic relations court); Palmer v. Palmer, 523 N.E.2d 1316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (awarding a
woman $150,000 compensatory and $5,000 punitive damages in her battery action after
her husband drove his car into a bridge abutment to injure her and then beat her, which
caused severe injuries including a broken neck).
Indiana: McNevin v. McNevin, 447 N.E.2d 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a
woman was not required to join her tort claim based upon having been struck and in-
jured by her husband in her divorce action).
Kansas: Ebert v. Ebert, 656 P.2d 766 (Kan. 1983) (holding that the interspousal tort
immunity does not bar a woman's tort action against her husband based upon multiple
incidents of alleged physical abuse, which caused a broken toe, broken'ribs, facial lacera-
tions, and other injuries).
Kentucky: Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
allegations that a husband committed adultery and endorsed checks with his wife's name
on them did not allege conduct that would constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
Louisiana: Laughlin v. Breaux, 515 So. 2d 480 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (awarding a woman
$57,297 in damages following proof that she suffered from battered woman's syndrome
caused by a pattern of domestic abuse by her former boyfriend that included verbal
harassment, beatings, and rapes); Duplechin v. Toce, 497 So. 2d 763 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(awarding a woman $52,000 in special and general damages based upon an incident in
which her husband threatened and tortured her), writ denied, 499 So. 2d 86 (La. 1987).
Maine: Caron v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178 (Me. 1990) (awarding a woman $119,000 in com-
pensatory and $75,000 in punitive damages and awarding her young son, the stepson of
the defendant, $20,000 in compensatory and $35,000 in punitive damages in an assault,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress action against the husband/
stepfather).
Maryland: Lusby v. Lusby, 390 A.2d 77 (Md. 1978) (permitting a woman to bring an
intentional tort action against her husband who allegedly forced her car off the road,
battered and raped her, and assisted two other men in their attempt to rape her).
Massachusetts: Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151 (Mass. 1988) (holding that a woman
was not required to join her tort claims in her divorce action based upon her allegation
that her former husband broke a glass panel in a door, grabbed her by the arm, and
violently pulled her, causing her repeatedly to strike her head against the door frame);
Terrio v. McDonough, 450 N.E.2d 190 (Mass. App. Ct.) (awarding a woman $15,000 in
damages following proof that she was raped and pushed down a flight of stairs by her
former boyfriend), review denied, 450 N.E.2d 190 (Mass.), and review denied, 453 N.E.
1231 (Mass. 1983).
Michigan: McCoy v. Cooke, 419 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing recovery to a
woman for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress subject to reduction
based upon a recovery that she already had received in her divorce action for her hus-
band's assaultive conduct); Goldman v. Wexler, 333 N.W.2d 121 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that a woman's tort claim against her former husband was not barred by her
divorce decree but that the husband could raise the issue of double recovery as an affirm-
ative defense).
Minnesota: Plath v. Plath, 428 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 1988) (holding that a two-year statute
of limitations barred a battery action by a wife based upon an allegation that her hus-
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band pushed her back, causing her to fall and break her hip); Montgomery v. Day, No.
C1-87-1911, 1988 WL 24844 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 1988) (unpublished opinion) (al-
lowing a woman to recover damages from a former boyfriend who fractured her arm),
review denied, 1988 WL 24844 (Minn. Apr. 28, 1988).
Mississippi: Cain v. McKinnon, 552 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1989) (holding that the interspousal
immunity doctrine does not bar an intentional tort action by a woman against her former
husband based upon allegations that he savagely and brutally assaulted and beat her);
Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1988) (abolishing the interspousal immunity judi-
cially and permitting a woman to proceed with a tort action based upon her allegation
that her husband assaulted and battered her).
Missouri: Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (holding that
the interspousal immunity does not bar a battery action by a woman against her hus-
band who shot her in the back); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (allowing a female cohabitant to raise assault and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress counterclaims in property dispute).
Nebraska: Hassing v. Wortman, 333 N.W.2d 765 (Neb. 1983) (disallowing a woman's
action against her former husband for intentional infliction of emotional distress because
his conduct of revealing her premarital pregnancy to relatives already aware of it, re-
vealing information to her employer that did not jeopardize her job, and engaging in
other inappropriate conduct did not cause emotional distress so severe that no reasona-
ble person could have been expected to endure it).
New Hampshire: Brown v. Brown, 577 A.2d 1227 (N.H. 1990) (excluding evidence of an
annulled criminal conviction for assault in a civil battery action by a wife).
New Jersey: Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189 (N.J. 1979) (holding that the "entire contro-
versy" rule required a woman to bring her tort action, based upon a beating by her
husband, as a part of her divorce action); Brown v. Brown, 506 A.2d 29 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986) (holding that a woman was not required by the "entire controversy" rule
to join her tort action with her divorce action because the divorce action already was
pending when the husband allegedly battered and assaulted her).
New York: Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457 (App. Div. 1985) (reducing a woman's
award from $90,000 to $45,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress by a man
with whom she lived for four years who killed her pet goose and subjected her to threats,
assaults, and general abusive conduct); Baron v. Jeffer, 469 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div.
1983) (dismissing an assault claim in a woman's action against the man with whom she
had lived because of statute of limitations); Gross v. Gross, 462 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (App. Div.
1983) (awarding a woman $25,000 in damages, reduced to $15,000 on appeal, for an as-
sault upon her by her former husband); Halio v. Lurie, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (App. Div.
1961) (recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in a case that
involved a man who humiliated his former girlfriend by dating her after marrying an-
other woman and by writing a sarcastic letter to her).
North Carolina: Gay v. Gay, 302 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (awarding a woman
$13,620 in compensatory and $10,000 in punitive damages following proof that her hus-
band committed numerous assaults and batteries upon her that caused a fracture of the
left leg and ankle and other injuries).
Ohio: Casalinova v. Solaro, No. 14052, 1989 WL 111942 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1989)
(unpublished opinion) (affirming a default judgment and $100,000 damage award for a
woman who suffered physical and mental abuse, with attendant injuries, on four separate
occasions in nonmarital relationship), dismissed, 549 N.E.2d 1190 (Ohio), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 3215 (1990); Grooms v. Grooms, No. 84AP-773, 1985 WL 9879 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 26, 1985) (unpublished opinion) (barring a wife by the applicable statute of limita-
tions in her assault and battery action against her husband based upon his striking her
in the face, breaking her nose, and injuring her mouth and teeth); Gabriel v. DePrisco,
No. L-84-063, 1984 WL 14343 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1984) (unpublished opinion) (bar-
ring a woman's assault and battery action against her former husband by applicable stat-
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ute of limitations); Woyczynski v. Wolf, 464 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (husband
sued his wife and his wife's attorney for malicious prosecution relating to domestic vio-
lence charges and she filed a counterclaim for assault which she subsequently agreed to
dismiss), overruled on other grounds by TrusseU v. General Motors Corp., 559 N.E.2d
732 (Ohio 1990); Gravill v. Gravill, No. 45542, 1983 WL 4631 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 25,
1983) (unpublished opinion) (civil action by a woman alleging that she suffered an as-
sault and battery by her husband); Lanter v. Lanter, No. C-820860, 1983 WL 5124 (Ohio
Ct. App. July 13, 1983) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a woman's ac-
tion for assault by her husband barred by the interspousal immunity); Owens v. Owens,
No. C-810878, 1982 WL 8622 (Ohio Ct. App. July 14, 1982) (per curiam) (unpublished
opinion) (holding that the applicable statute of limitations barred a woman's assault and
battery action against her husband who allegedly drove his car away when she was par-
tially out of the car, dragging her several feet and causing a rear tire to pass over her
right arm); Green v. Green, 446 N.E.2d 837 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a wo-
mail's assault and battery action against her husband was barred by the applicable one-
year statute of limitations); Lee v. Lee, No. 339, 1981 WL 5121 (Ohio Ct. App. May 20,
1981) (unpublished opinion) (holding that an assault and battery action by woman
against former husband that was filed after the marriage ended was not barred by inter-
spousal immunity).
Oklahoma: Floyd v. Dotson, 692 P.2d 77 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the trial
court erred when the jury awarded $10,000 in damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress for conduct of the defendant that involved a threat to use nude photos of
plaintiff and a cassette recording of their love-making because jury instruction required
the conduct to be unreasonable rather than extreme and outrageous).
Oregon: Apitz v. Damages, 287 P.2d 585 (Ore. 1955) (allowing the executor of a woman's
estate to sue the estate of the woman's husband who had murdered her and committed
suicide).
Tennessee: Whatley v. Whatley, No. 15, 1988 WL 42971 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 1988)
(allowing a woman to receive a jury award of $22,473 compensatory and $45,000 punitive
damages, reduced by the trial judge to $14,700 compensatory and $20,000 punitive dam-
ages, in an action against her former husband that was based upon an incident in which
he beat her); Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (barring a woman
from proceeding with her battery action because the tort cause of action had been con-
sidered during the divorce proceedings and the woman already had been awarded dam-
ages for her injuries).
Texas: Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (awarding $15,000 for
a "negligent" infliction of emotional distress action brought against a husband who pres-
sured his wife to engage in bondage and other sexual conduct offensive to her); Chiles v.
Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the trial court had erred in
awarding the plaintiff $500,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a sepa-
rate cause of action in her divorce action, despite a jury finding that there was physical
and verbal abuse, harassment, threats and generally provocative conduct); Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 750 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a woman is not permitted
to bring an independent tort action because she sought, as part of her prior divorce
proceedings, a disproportionate share of the marital property because of her husband's
assault upon her); Misleh v. Misleh, No. 01-86-0366-CV, 1987 WL 13524 (Tex. Ct. App.
July 9, 1987) (unpublished opinion) (upholding a jury award of $7,000 in actual and
$45,000 in punitive damages for assault and false imprisonment claims by a woman who
was beaten by her husband); Ulrich v. Ulrich, 652 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
(awarding a woman $15,000 in damages as part of divorce proceedings for physical abuse
by her husband that included a twisting of her ankle until it broke and a twisting of her
wrist until it broke).
Utah: Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988) (permitting a woman to proceed with
an independent tort action based on having been shot in the head by her husband while
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she lay in bed with consequent total and permanent disability even though the shooting
incident was considered in her divorce proceeding, but with the provision that double
recovery was not to be received); Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387 (Utah 1985) (requir-
ing a woman to litigate a battery claim that was based upon physical abuse by her hus-
band in a tort action separate from her divorce action); Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288
(Utah 1983) (holding that actionable torts between married persons should not be liti-
gated in a divorce proceeding and dismissing a woman's assault and battery action be-
cause of the applicable statute of limitations).
Vermont: Ward v. Ward, 583 A.2d 577 (Vt. 1990) (holding that a woman was barred
from joining her assault and battery claims against her husband in her divorce action).
West Virginia: Criss v. Criss, 356 S.E.2d 620 (W. Va. 1987) (holding that a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress was duplicitous of assault and battery claims
based upon an incident in which estranged husband of plaintiff allegedly threatened her
with a hunting knife, forced her to undress, and sexually assaulted her); Coffindaffer v.
Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978) (holding that interspousal immunity does not
bar an action by a woman against her husband in which she alleged that he negligently
struck her with an automobile and then intentionally assaulted her causing her further
injuries).
Wisconsin: Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988) (permitting a woman to pro-
ceed with her assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress action
against her former husband despite a prior divorce decree because it is contrary to public
policy to require joinder even though joinder of the divorce action and interspousal tort
action would be permissible); Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9 (Wis. 1974) (father of an
illegitimate child sought judicial determination of paternity and the mother counter-
claimed with claims of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
seduction).
Federal Courts: Abbott v. Williams, 888 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Alabama
law in a battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress action by a woman
against her former husband and concluding that prior divorce decree did not bar subse-
quent tort action unless the settlement agreement settled all claims, including the tort
claims); Moran v. Beyer, 734 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the Illinois inter-
spousal tort immunity statute was unconstitutional in an action by a woman whose hus-
band beat her on numerous occasions and claimed that he was justified on grounds of
provocation and self-defense); Reitmeier v. Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565 (D.N.J. 1986)
(during the course of a real property dispute between prior cohabitants a man sought
partition and the woman counterclaimed based upon fifteen alleged instances of assault
and battery); Abady v. Macaluso, 90 F.R.D. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (man brought a compli-
cated tort and contract action against former girlfriend and her mother; former girlfriend
counterclaimed for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false im-
prisonment, and other torts).
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